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NAVIGATING THE BLUE ECONOMY
EDWARD CANUEL*
The time has come, the Walrus said,
To talk of many things:
Of shoes—and ships—and sealing-wax—
Of cabbages—and kings—
And why the sea is boiling hot—
And whether pigs have wings.1
And like the conversation of the Walrus and Carpenter walking
along the “wet as wet could be”2 sea, the blue economy offers us the op-
portunity to talk of many things. Part I of this Article analyzes what the
blue economy is and its relevance. Governance mechanisms, including
ecosystem-based management and marine spatial planning are introduced
and reviewed. The section discusses the benefits associated with such
mechanisms, including streamlined decision-making, promoting levels of
certainty, and convening stakeholders. Associated challenges also exist,
such as emboldening bureaucratic in-fighting, perceptions of sovereignty
threats, and implementation hurdles. Part II further reviews public and
private law issues which intersect the blue economy within the domestic
and international governance context, focusing on topics including seafood
fraud; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”) fishing; and bio-
prospecting. This includes analysis of various coordination challenges
concerning international enforcement measures, particularly regarding
the United States and European Union. Part III examines the Arctic as
a blue economy case study where many of these governance-focused
concepts intersect. The Article concludes with a discussion of the blue
economy’s unique research potential.
* The author, Dr. Edward T. Canuel, is a U.S. Foreign Service Officer and most recently
served as Director for Critical Infrastructure at the National Security Council. He is an
Honorary Professor at Aalborg University and Aarhus University and is an adjunct pro-
fessor at American University. Note that this Article does not represent the views of the
U.S. government.
1 Lewis Carroll, The Walrus and the Carpenter, POETRYFOUND., https://www.poetryfounda
tion.org/poems/43914/the-walrus-and-the-carpenter-56d222cbc80a9 [https://perma.cc
/ET3V-6C2W] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
2 Id.
1
2 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:1
I. BOILING THE OCEAN: THE BLUE ECONOMY’S ROOTS,
IMPORTANCE, AND CHALLENGES
To understand the blue economy requires investigating its roots
in “sustainable development,” a term melding “existing and future econ-
omic, human development, and social issues and needs.”3 The 1987
Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future further defined sustain-
able development as a means to reach “the needs and aspirations of the
present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future.”4
The 1992 U.N. Conference in Rio de Janeiro led to a Declaration that set
out sustainable development principles.5 Agenda 21 then recommended
ways to address environmental degradation and advance sustainable
development.6 In 2006 the U.N. Millennium Declaration also fostered
goals, which expired in 2015, that broadened sustainable development
to include a significant social dimension.7 Thereafter, the 2012 Rio+ 20
UN Conference on Sustainable Development’s Declaration presented a
common vision while reemphasizing sustainable development principles.8
Rio+ is viewed as the conceptual birth of the blue economy.9 In 2015,
the blue economy gained further attention as the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Resolution Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development.10 Building on the Millennium Development Goals,
the U.N. introduced seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs,
3 See Edward T. Canuel, Sustainable Development, Natural Resource Extraction, and the
Arctic: The Road Ahead, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 32, 33 (2016).
4 World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987),
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CQ9M-WSCR].
5 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992).
6 AGENDA 21: EARTH’S ACTION PLAN § 38.1 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993).
7 See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affs., The Millennium Development Goals Report 2006
(June 2006), http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/MDG
Report2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/B99X-FRGH].
8 See Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.216/L.1 (June 19, 2012).
9 Jennifer J. Silver et al., Blue Economy and Competing Discourses in International Oceans
Governance, 24 J.ENV’T &DEV. 135, 137 (2015) (suggesting the blue economy gained mean-
ing due to a hybrid of: “(a) oceans as natural capital, (b) oceans as good business, (c) oceans
as integral to Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and (d) oceans as small-scale
fisheries (SSF) livelihoods.”); see also Michelle Voyer et al., Shades of Blue: What Do Com-
peting Interpretations of the Blue Economy Mean for Oceans Governance?, J. ENV’T POL’Y
& PLAN. (2018).
10 See G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment (Oct. 21, 2015).
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with 169 guiding targets through 2030.11 The SDGs are viewed as “a
universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that
all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030.”12 Of note, SDG Goal 14
seeks to “[c]onserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine
resources for sustainable development” for guidance in identifying the
blue economy.13
Throughout its progression as a widely acknowledge concept, it re-
mained unclear as to what exactly a blue economy looks like and how
best to develop it.14 Even today, there is no singular definition; as a socially
constructed concept, any attempted definition is fluid.15 In such a vac-
uum, multiple definitions, with varying degrees of overlap, emerged. The
Economist posited that “[a] sustainable ocean economy emerges when
economic activity is in balance with the long-term capacity of ocean
ecosystems to support this activity and remain resilient and healthy.”16
In 2015, The World Wildlife Fund further defined the blue economy as
a marine based economy that:
Provides social and economic benefits for current and
future generations, by contributing to food security, pov-
erty eradication, livelihoods, income, employment, health,
safety, equity, and political stability. Restores, protects
and maintains the diversity, productivity, resilience, core
functions, and intrinsic value of marine ecosystems—the
natural capital upon which its prosperity depends. Is
based on clean technologies, renewable energy, and circu-
lar material flows to secure economic and social stability
over time, while keeping within the limits of one planet.17
11 See id. ¶ 3.
12 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, What are the Sustainable Development Goals?, https://www
.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html [https://perma.cc
/CD98-6A4P] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
13 See U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFS., Sustainable Development Goal 14, https://sustain
abledevelopment.un.org/sdg14 [https://perma.cc/6J73-W395] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
14 See Natalie Parletta, Making the Blue Economy Sustainable, FORBES (June 21, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalieparletta/2019/06/21/making-the-blue-economy-a-sus
tainable-reality/#1dab109426f8 [https://perma.cc/YP3J-3382].
15 See Andrew Hancock, U.N. Dep’t Econ. & Soc. Affs. Stat. Div., Overview: “Investigating
the Blue Economy: Towards a Statistical Standard,” ESA/STAT/AC.340/17 (Aug. 25, 2017).
16 The Blue Economy: Growth, Opportunity and a Sustainable Ocean Economy, ECONOMIST
7 (2015), https://www.woi.economist.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/m1_EIU_The-Blue
-Economy_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGJ6-NHW7].
17 Principles for a Sustainable Blue Economy, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND 4 (2017), https://
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And multiple countries have additionally offered multiple nu-
anced definitions.18 A senior U.S. official opined, for example, that the
blue economy “recogniz[es] that conservation and environmentally sus-
tainable management practices are the pathways, not the roadblocks, to
enabling long-term economic development and growth.”19 A blue economy
is also an entrepreneurial, collaborative, and competitive knowledge-
based economy, that scans the global sea for extraction of material goods
and the data and information to address societal challenges—and inspire
their solutions.20 The key elements in this holistic approach are: “sound
science, innovative management approaches, effective enforcement,
meaningful partnerships, and robust public participation.”21 The blue
economy’s economic importance is vast. In 2016, the U.S. Ocean and
Great Lakes economy accounted for $129,000,000,000 in wages.22 As of
2017, Europe’s maritime sector employed over five million jobs generating
almost 500,000,000,000 euro a year.23 The marine fisheries sector addition-
ally supports an estimated 8% of the global population.24 The potential
wwwwwfse.cdn.triggerfish.cloud/uploads/2019/01/wwf-principles-for-a-sustainable-blue
-economy-15_1471_.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQU4-CQLY].
18 See Jon Axworthy, Africa’s Blue Economy: Five Nations Poised for Growth, RACONTEUR
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.raconteur.net/finance/maritime-economy-2019/blue-econ
omy-africa [https://perma.cc/XVN5-3YDR].
19 Catherine Novelli, Celebrating Ingenuity in the Blue Economy, DIPNOTE (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://2007-2017-blogs.state.gov/stories/2016/12/20/celebrating-ingenuity-blue-econ
omy.html [https://perma.cc/T66E-2BX3].
20 Rick Spinrad, We Can Live Better by Learning from Our Oceans, MIAMIHERALD (July 6,
2016), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article88120617.html [https://perma.cc
/RN4M-MGXS]; see also Exploring the Potential of the Blue Economy, U.N. DEP’T ECON. &
SOC.AFFS. (June 17, 2017), https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/sustainable/ex
ploring-potential-of-blue-economy.html [https://perma.cc/2SYZ-C4MX] (Statement of Wu
Hongbo, Secretary-General of the Ocean Conference and Under Secretary General of the
U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs) (“A blue economy is a long-term strategy
aimed at supporting sustainable economic growth through oceans-related sectors and activi-
ties, while improving human well-being and social equity and preserving the environment”).
21 Status of Stocks 2017, NOAAFISHERIES (May 14, 2018), https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov
/feature-story/status-stocks-2017 [https://perma.cc/2ZVH-CEN7] (specifically referencing
sustainable fisheries management).
22 NOAA REPORT ON THE U.S. OCEAN AND GREAT LAKES ECONOMY, NOAA OFF. COASTAL
MGMT. 1 (2018), https://coast.noaa.gov/data/digitalcoast/pdf/econ-report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/E3K9-D22G]; see also Charles S. Colgan, Measurement of the Ocean and Coastal Econ-
omy: Theory and Methods, NAT’L OCEAN ECON. PROGRAM PUBL’N 3 (Dec. 1, 2003).
23 Eur. Comm’n, Commission Staff Working Document: Report on the Blue Growth Strat-
egy Towards More Sustainable Growth and Jobs in the Blue Economy, at 3, SWD (2017)
128 (Mar. 31, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/swd
-2017-128_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/48YJ-TR54].
24 Subrata Sarker et al., From Science to Action: Exploring the Potentials of Blue Economy
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economic gain from restoring fish stocks and “optimally” reducing fishing
capacity is approximately $50,000,000,000 per year.25 And let’s not forget
energy and mineral extraction potential. According to the International En-
ergy Agency, offshore wind has the potential to generate more than 420,000
TWh per year worldwide.26 The IEA forecasts that within the coming
decades offshore wind will evolve into a $1,000,000,000,000 business.27
The blue economy can also tackle pressing socioeconomic prob-
lems affecting the world. An estimated thirty-two percent of fish stocks
globally are overexploited, recovering from depletion, or depleted.28 Emis-
sions cause coral bleaching, ocean acidification, and sea level rise.29 Other
coastal tourism pressures include water pollution and consumption, waste,
pressure on biodiversity, and survival of indigenous cultures.30 The global
population could grow to around 8,500,000,000 in 2030, 9,700,000,000 in
2050, and 10,900,000,000 in 210031—and marine food and energy sources
will play key roles in meeting future needs.32 To meet such challenges,
the blue economy plays a pivotal role: bringing critical constituencies
together to make coordinated, informed decisions concerning how marine
resources may be sustainably derived and utilized, considering diverse
actors ranging from industry to governments.
But we must also balance the aspirational nature of the blue econ-
omy and tackle, analyze, and, to some extent, tilt the hypothetical to
for Enhancing Economic Sustainability in Bangladesh, OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 157,
180 (2018).
25 See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, Green Economy in a Blue World: Synthesis Report, at 8
(2012), https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/ted-ditc-05122016-cancun-GreenEcon
omy-Blue-unep.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GTF-4BFD]; see also V.N. Attri, An Emerging New
Development Paradigm of the Blue Economy in IORA: A Policy Framework for the Future,
INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASS’N 1 (2016), https://www.iora.int/media/23838/the-blue-economy
-and-iora-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GF4-97Q4].
26 Int’l Energy Agency [IEA], Offshore Wind Outlook 2019 (2019), https://www.iea.org
/reports/offshore-wind-outlook-2019 [https://perma.cc/SN2V-HLEF] (noting that as of 2019,
offshore wind currently provides 0.3% of global power generation).
27 Id.
28 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 25, at 8.
29 Ocean Acidification and Coral Bleaching, EARTHJOURNALISMNETWORK (June 9, 2016),
https://earthjournalism.net/resources/ocean-acidification-and-coral-bleaching [https://
perma.cc/UY9W-FXJD].
30 See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, Marine and Coastal Ecosystems and Human Well-Being,
at 22–29 (2006).
31 U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., Population Div., World Population Prospects 2019:
Highlights, 1, ST/ESA/SER.A/423 (2019).
32 Carlos M. Duarte et al., Will the Oceans Help Feed Humanity?, 59 BIOSCIENCE 967, 967
(2009).
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focus on the achievable. To accomplish this, one should strongly consider
a bedrock of the blue economy, governance. EU blue growth strategies,
in particular, are aspirational in vision while emphasizing governance.33
Take, for example, The Marine Strategy Framework (“MSF”) Directive,
adopted on June 17, 2008, as affected by Commission Decision (“EU”)
2017/848 of May 17, 2017.34 The MSF Directive seeks to achieve Good
Environmental Status (“GES”)35 of the EU’s marine waters by 2020 and
protect the resource base which marine-related economic and social ac-
tivities depend on.36 Each Member State is required to develop a strategy
for its marine waters (or Marine Strategy) that must be kept up-to-date
and reviewed every six years.37 The EU also established a framework for
Maritime Spatial Planning,38 where the application of an ecosystem-
based approach is considered essential to promote “the sustainable de-
velopment and growth of the maritime and coastal economies and the
sustainable use of marine and coastal resources.”39
33 Eur. Comm’n, supra note 23, at 3.
34 Commission Decision 2017/848, 2017 O.J. (L 125) 1.
35 Under MSF Directive Article 3, GES is “the environmental status of marine waters
where these provide ecologically diverse and dynamic oceans and seas which are clean,
healthy and productive.” See Eur. Comm’n, Our Oceans, Seas and Coasts: Achieve Good
Environmental Status, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/good-environmental-stat
us/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/UD56-FMUZ] (last updated Dec. 31, 2019) (note that
to help Member States interpret what GES means in practice, the Directive sets out, in
Annex I, eleven qualitative descriptors which describe what the environment will look
like when GES has been achieved).
36 Id.
37 Eur. Comm’n, Our Oceans, Seas and Coasts: The Marine Strategy Framework Directive,
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/marine-strategy
-framework-directive/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/MSX6-L7MZ] (last updated Feb. 7,
2020) (“A Marine Strategy includes . . . (i) an initial assessment of the current environ-
mental status of national marine waters and the environmental impact and socio-economic
analysis of human activities in these waters; (ii) determination of what GES means for
national marine waters; (iii) establishment of environmental targets and associated indi-
cators to achieve GES by 2020; (iv) the establishment of a monitoring program for the
ongoing assessment and the regular update of targets; and (v) development of a program
of measures designed to achieve or maintain GES by 2020.”).
38 Directive 2014/89/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014,
Establishing a Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 1, https://eur
-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/89/oj [https://perma.cc/536P-V822].
39 Council Regulation 1005/2008 of Sept. 29, 2008, Establishing a Community System to
Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 2014 O.J.
(L 257) 1; see also Council Regulation 1224/2009 of Nov. 20, 2009, Establishing a Community
Control System For Ensuring Compliance with the Rule of the Common Fisher Policy,
2009 O.J. (L 343) 1; see also Regulation 1379/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
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Federal maritime spatial planning in the U.S. is guided by a Na-
tional Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great
Lakes.40 The National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan41 and Implemen-
tation Plan Appendix describe federal agency actions addressing ocean
challenges, greater opportunities for federal, state, local, tribal, and terri-
torial (“SLTT”) engagement in marine planning decisions and streamlining
federal operations.42 The National Policy notes marine planning as a na-
tional implementation objective to address the sustainable use of the
ocean, U.S. coasts, and the Great Lakes.43 The intended result is promoting
more efficient, effective decision-making and enhance regional “well-
being.”44 Note that the Implementation Plan has voluntary initiatives.45
Such planning considers the multiplicity of stakeholder interests, ad-
heres to flexible approaches, and, through a coordinated approach, may
reduce permitting disputes and delays while striving for advancing
regulatory streamlining and certainty.46
Marine spatial planning (“MSP”)47 is an important additional gov-
ernance tool; it assembles ocean participants—including energy, industry,
Council of Dec. 11, 2013 on the Common Organization of the Markets in Fishery and
Aquaculture Products, 2013 O.J. (L 354) 1.
40 Exec. Order No. 13,547, 3 C.F.R. 13,547 (2011).
41 NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLE-
MENTATIONPLAN(2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/nop_ip
_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YHN-LW46].
42 NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLE-
MENTATION PLAN APPENDIX, at 3, 5, 12–13, 16–17, 24 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_ocean_policy_ip_appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Q5WS-N4MZ].
43 Exec. Order No. 13,547, supra note 40.
44 Id.
45 The Implementation Plan supports voluntary regional marine planning, a science-based
tool that regions can use to address specific ocean management challenges and advance their
economic development and conservation objectives. See generally NAT’LOCEANCOUNCIL,
EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN MARINE
PLANNING (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_ocean
_policy_implementation_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V73-GNHX]. An example of what is
considered effective marine planning includes Oregon, which mapped resources to identify
information gaps to avoid potential wave energy conflicts. Id. Additionally, Rhode Island
identified uses/resources, including military needs, to ensure offshore wind energy may
be situated in proper places. Id. “Neither the National Ocean Policy nor marine planning
creates or changes regulations or authorities.” Id.
46 NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN APPENDIX, supra note 42, at 4, 19, 24.
47 Andy Lanier, Marine Spatial Planning in Oregon for Marine Renewable Energy Develop-
ment, EUR. TECH. & INNOVATION PLATFORM FOR OCEAN ENERGY (Nov. 19, 2019), https://
www.etipocean.eu/assets/Uploads/MSPlanning-ETIPOceanMSP-Webinar-Nov2019-Andy
-Lanier.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8KF-ZN6L].
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government, conservation and recreation stakeholders—to make informed
and coordinated decisions about how to use marine resources sustain-
ably.48 MSP involves integration and policy frameworks.49 Ecosystem-based
Management (“EBM”) is another powerful, yet complex, governance
mechanism.50 “Here,51 managers are encouraged to build on ecosystems
and other physical and spatial conceptualizations of the marine environ-
ment,” with EBM suggested as a means to assist with effective sea gov-
ernance.52 Issues threatening ocean health can be reviewed, such as the
effects of climate change, IUU fishing or marine pollution.53
EBM, as with marine planning writ large, is not without challenges.
Regional organizations and governments may view such initiatives as
potentially threatening previously designed priorities, funding, or threaten
autonomy/control, which would jeopardize the values of any related
initiative.54 A champion is additionally needed. Sound government policies
or legislative anchors are asserted as crucial to implementing EBM-based
plans, which will never be operative if government departments or agencies
are without capacity to implement them.55 Analysis of any implementa-
tion measures focuses on specific cases. “Identifying relevant actors, man-
agement units, social and environmental processes, and timetables in-
volved in effective implementation of a policy or legal obligation is not a
generic task with a set checklist of activities.”56 Implementation is also
difficult, as different approaches differ dependent on the individual sector;
a uniform, cross-sectoral model may be difficult to implement in practice.57
Nonetheless, looking to and across cases can inform what needs to be
effected in any specific sector. Further, while the similarly voluntary nature
48 Id.
49 Joanna Vince, Oceans Governance and Marine Spatial Planning in Australia, 6 AUSTL.
J. MAR. & OCEAN AFF. 5, 5, 11 (2014).
50 Ecosystem Approaches, DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFS. & THE L. OF THE SEA, U. N. (updated
July 21, 2010), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/ecosystem_approaches/ecosystem_approaches
.htm#:~:text=While%20there%20is%20no%20single,to%20ensure%20that%20ecosystems
%20structure [https://perma.cc/YDH8-VYUG], cited in Joseph F.C. DiMento, Environ-
mental Governance of the Arctic: Law, Effect, Now Implementation, 6 U.C. IRVINE L.REV.
23, 52 n.136 (2016) (referring to ecosystems-based management).
51 Ecosystem-Based Management, NOAA, https://ecosystems.noaa.gov/EBM101/Whatis Eco
system-BasedManagement.aspx [https://perma.cc/EV7R-CHPE] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
52 DiMento, supra note 50, at 52 (referring to ecosystems-based management); see also
Rachel D. Long, Anthony Charles, & Robert L. Stephenson, Key Principles of Marine
Ecosystem-Based Management, 57 MARINE POL’Y 53, 53–54 (2015).
53 Vince, supra note 49, at 13.
54 DiMento, supra note 50, at 53–54 (referring to ecosystems-based management).
55 Vince, supra note 49.
56 DiMento, supra note 50, at 51 (referring to ecosystems-based management).
57 Id. See also NOAA, supra note 51.
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of marine spatial planning allows operational flexibility, the inability to
mandate planning measures also questions whether compliance will be
fulsome.58 Moreover, what of the ex ante and ex post transaction costs, such
as continued monitoring and enforcement? If measures are not simply
repackaged as old wine in new bottles, assumably additional costs will
be borne by stakeholders, whether from SLTTs or the private sector.59
II. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES: SEAFOOD FRAUD, IUU FISHING AND
EMERGING BIO-PROSPECTING
Blue economy governance implementation challenges are evident
in IUU fishing and seafood fraud.60 These differ in their scale and scope.61
Seafood is the most valuable traded commodity in the world, with nearly
$150,000,000,000 in sales each year.62 Relatedly, the stakes are high for
IUU fishing, which amounts to an estimated $23,500,000,000 worth of
seafood annually.63 IUU fishing is a broad term that captures a wide vari-
ety of fishing activity, concerning all aspects/stages of the capture and
utilization of fish.64 IUU fishing is found in all types and dimensions of
fisheries; it occurs both on the high seas and in areas within national
jurisdiction.65 Seafood fraud is the practice of misleading consumers about
their seafood in order to increase profits66: “buyers are deceived as to the
type, quality, or amount of seafood they purchase.”67
58 MARITIME SPATIAL PLANNING: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE, 365, 367, 389 (Jacek Zaucha &
Kira Gee eds., 2019).
59 SOFIA O’CONNOR ET AL., BLUE PROSPERITY COAL., DESIGNING MARINE SPATIAL PLAN-
NING LEGISLATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION:AGUIDE FOR LEGAL DRAFTERS, 42 (2020), https://
www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/msp-law-workshop-report-11may20-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FZ66-UR7T].
60 SJARIEF WIDJAJA ET AL., HIGH LEVEL PANEL FOR A SUSTAINABLE OCEAN ECONOMY, IL-
LEGAL,UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING AND ASSOCIATED DRIVERS, 9–10 (2020),
https://oceanpanel.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Illegal%2C%20Unreported%20and%20Un
regulated%20Fishing%20and%20Associated%20Drivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP2L-G52R].
61 Id.; Huw Thomas, To Fight Illegal Fishing, Follow the Money, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.
(June 18, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/06/19
/to-fight-illegal-fishing-follow-the-money [https://perma.cc/EDV7-WAMZ].
62 Thomas, supra note 61.
63 Id.
64 What is IUU Fishing?, FOOD&AGRIC.ORG. OF THE U.N.,http://www.fao.org/iuu-fishing
/background/what-is-iuu-fishing/en/ [https://perma.cc/S398-STUL] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
65 Id.
66 What is Seafood Fraud?, OCEANA, https://oceana.org/what-seafood-fraud#:~:text=Sea
food%20fraud%20is%20the%20practice,conservation%20efforts%20and%20human
%20health [https://perma.cc/98T3-NGNQ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
67 Thomas Lampert, Stopping Illegal Fishing and Seafood Fraudsters: The Presidential Task
10 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:1
IUU fishing and seafood fraud cause numerous problems: under-
mining national and regional fish stock management and conservation
efforts,68 threatening the global fisheries’ robustness, and posing health
risks (particularly from high levels of mercury) to people consuming mis-
labeled seafood.69 The obstacles to tackle these challenges include “the
international nature of the industry, a byzantine supply chain, the large
number of entities responsible for combating the issue, the lack of re-
sources provided to these agencies, and the difficulty identifying and
differentiating species of seafood.”70
Significant difficulties in addressing IUU fishing and seafood
fraud include the nature of complicated, international supply chains71:
Force’s Plan on Tackling IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1629, 1630
(2017) (referencing DEP’T OF COM., PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISH-
ING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD: ACTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE TASK FORCE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, 5 (2014)).
68 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., supra note 64.
69 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1630–31; see generally Michael Conathan & Avery Siciliano,
The Future of Seafood Security: The Fight Against Illegal Fishing and Seafood Fraud,
CTR. FOR AM.PROGRESS (June 8, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/re
ports/2016/06/08/139004/the-future-of-seafood-security-the-fight-against-illegal-fishing
-and-seafood-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/HZ8P-7JW6].
70 Lampert, supra note 67; U.S.FOOD&DRUGADMIN.,IMPORTANT ALERT16-04:MISBRANDED
SEAFOOD (published Feb. 4, 2020) (“The guidance section provides an alphabetical listing of
seafood names associated with previous entries broken out into three parts. Part I lists
acceptable names, appropriate scientific names and/or the source of Product (Country or
Geographical Origin) for species that have historically been substituted or otherwise
misbranded, Part II lists examples of known fictitious names, and Part III provides recent
examples of misbranded products and the names of the actual species that they were
substituted for, found in interstate commerce. The Red List at the end of this document
identifies firms that have misbranded seafood products entering the United States.”).
71 The seafood sector is characterized by complex supply chains. In fact,
‘chain’ is a slightly misleading term because the layers, including mul-
tiple levels of middlemen, can be so intricate and opaque as to more closely
resemble a web. Fish and shellfish are harvested in open waters or raised
via aquaculture in ponds, tanks, or bounded coastal waters. Some wild-
caught fish may be transported from the catching vessel by trans-
shipment vessel to market. After harvest, shellfish are sold via auction,
broker or market system and then packed and transported to processing
facilities or wholesalers. Processors convert the shellfish to consumer
products such as canned, frozen, or smoked products, and fillets or other
fresh products. Some fish may pass through multiple levels of processing,
while others, such as certain kinds of shellfish, are transported live.
Wholesalers receive both processed products, as well as more minimally
processed fresh fish, from both foreign and domestic sources. The whole-
salers then distribute the products to retailers and restaurants, where
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“seafood passes through various entities on its way from the ocean to the
[consumer], and is often not labeled with its country of origin[; as a result],
species substitution and mislabeling are extremely difficult to identify.”72
Additionally, as fishers often package and process their catch at sea, on
processing vessels, it becomes difficult to ensure that legal and illegal catch
are not mixed, presenting added challenges for regulators and buyers to
accurately identify correct species.73 The numerous domestic entities
fighting seafood fraud and IUU fishing and/or serving in rule-making
capacities complicate enforcement efforts.74 In the United States, at least
three federal agencies are involved.75 Constrained resources also affect
enforcement. As of 2016, an estimated ninety-two U.S. inspectors are re-
sponsible for inspecting American seafood—suggesting that each inspec-
tor would need to physically examine fifty-six million pounds of seafood.76
Different international organizations, states, and multilateral fora tackle
related enforcement challenges differently: the United Nations (“U.N.”),
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (“RFMOs”),77 the EU, and
the United States “combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud through a variety
of treaties and legislation designed to identify and punish those engaged in
these practices[,]”78 including the Port State Measures Act (the PSMA).79
they are purchased by consumers. Accurately mapping a supply chain
requires an understanding of the roles of all of these different actors.
Protections Against Trafficking in Persons: Mapping the Seafood Supply Chain, RESPON-
SIBLESOURCINGTOOL, 1–2, https://www.responsiblesourcingtool.org/download/seafood/SF
_Tool_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/378L-M9BX] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
72 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1637.
73 Kashfi Halford, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Frequently asked questions,
PEWCHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analy
sis/articles/2013/02/25/illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-frequently-asked-ques
tions [https://perma.cc/ZP4S-66HD]; Lampert, supra note 67, at 1638.
74 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1638.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1639. But see Jason Huffman, Trump’s signature gives 26% boost to imported
seafood inspections, UNDERCURRENT NEWS (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.undercurrent
news.com/2019/02/18/trumps-signature-gives-26-boost-to-imported-seafood-inspections/
[https://perma.cc/B6TU-XRTM] (noting that “98% of the foreign seafood coming in is not
even tested. When it’s tested, the FDA often finds that it contains salmonella, it contains
listeria, it contains dirt and it contains illegal drugs, like antibiotics. What does that mean?
Well, if you eat enough of this stuff, aside from the fact that you could grow an extra ear
or glow in the dark, you develop a resistance to antibiotics.”).
77 Tore Henriksen, The Arctic Ocean, Env’t Stewardship, and the Law of the Sea, 6 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 61, 73 (2016).
78 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1640.
79 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UN, Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA), FAO,
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“These various efforts call for the collection and tracking of data, various
modes of enforcement, support and training for developing countries, and
coordination among domestic and international entities.”80
Four UN treaties lay the foundation for efforts to combat IUU
fishing and seafood fraud.81 The various UN agreements call on nations
to organize RFMOs, which may “create mandatory international standards
designed to combat IUU fishing.”82 RFMOs may include “mandates for
reporting, vessel monitoring, enforcement, and inspection mechanisms.”83
Examples of RFMOs are the Commission for the Conservation of Antarc-
tic Marine Living Resources, the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization,
the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, and the Southeast Atlantic
Fisheries Organization.84
https://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/en/ [https://perma.cc/VF99-WFY] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2020) (explaining the PSMA is “the first binding international agreement to
specifically target [IUU] fishing. Its objective is to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing
by preventing vessels engaged in IUU fishing from using ports and landing their catches. . . .
The provisions of the PSMA apply to fishing vessels seeking entry into a designated port
of a State which is different to their flag State.”); see Tony J. Pitcher et al., Estimating
Illegal and Unreported Catches From Marine Ecosystems: A Basis For Change, 3 FISH &
FISHERIES 317, 319 (2002) (discussing definitions of IUU fishing); see also Enforcement Ef-
forts to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, NOAAFISHERIES, https://www
.fisheries.noaa.gov/enforcement-efforts-combat-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing
[https://perma.cc/YGF4-LVCZ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (“The PSMA sets minimum stan-
dards for exercising port state controls over foreign vessels seeking entry into ports, and
over those vessels’ activities while in port. Implementing the PSMA also ensures compliance
with [RFMOs’] conservation and management measures. Another major provision of the
PSMA is an emphasis on increased information sharing and communications among
participating nations, relevant enforcement agencies, and relevant international organiza-
tions, such as RFMOs.”).
80 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1640.
81 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 62, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Agreement to Promote Compliance With International Conservation and Manage-
ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, preamble, Nov. 24, 1993, 2221
U.N.T.S. 91; Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Sept. 8, 1995,
2167 U.N.T.S. 3; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agreement
on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated Fishing, Nov. 22, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. No. 112-4.
82 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1644.
83 Id.
84 Regional fisheries management organizations and deep-sea fisheries, FAO OF THE U.N.,
FISHERIESDIV., http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166304.en [https://perma.cc/5TT6-9927]
(last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
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Although RFMOs often take an ecosystem-focused approach, such
governance frameworks face obstacles that include unavailable or in-
complete data and ineffective administration systems.85 No RFMOs exist
with a mandate to manage deep-sea fisheries in the Arctic, Central, and
Southwest Atlantic; as such, regulation of fishing in those areas falls to
each flag State’s discretion.86 But note that under UNCLOS, States must
“cooperate with other States on the conservation of marine living re-
sources in the high seas and in developing appropriate management mea-
sures where nationals exploit similar resources or different resources in
the same area.”87
Various EU measures combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.88
These regulations acknowledge the EU’s treaty obligations and lay out
specific steps.89 U.S. federal efforts to combat IUU fishing and seafood
fraud focus on The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act (“MSA”),90 addressing fishing in federal waters, tackling
overfishing and seeking to ensure consumers receive safe seafood.91 The
Act creates eight regional fishery management councils comprised of
public and private entities, includes measures “to improve identification,
tracking, and consequences for IUU fishing[,]” and “creates enforcement
mechanisms.”92 The MSA requires a biennial report to Congress93 regarding
compliance with requirements internationally, recognizing the importance
of global cooperation tackling IUU fishing, and also preventing fishing
methods adversely impacting marine resources and harming the U.S.
seafood industry.94 And within the United States, a June 17, 2014 Presi-




88 Seafood Fraud, OCEANA, https://eu.oceana.org/en/our-work/seafood-fraud/overview [https://
perma.cc/NA6L-XBDW] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
89 Establishing a Community System to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing, supra note 39.
90 About the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), U.S. REG’L FISHERY MGMT. COUNCILS, http://
www.fisherycouncils.org/about-the-msa/ [https://perma.cc/HC7Z-WZH7] (last visited Nov. 2,
2020); Magnuson-Stevens Act, NOAA FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic
/laws-policies [https://perma.cc/K9FQ-FHP6] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
91 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1647.
92 Id.
93 CHRIS OLIVER & NEIL A. JACOBS, IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT,
2019 REPORT TO CONGRESS, DEP’T OF COM. & NOAA FISHERIES at 7 (2019).
94 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1647–48.
14 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:1
IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud.95 An implementing Task Force Action
Plan targets IUU fishing and seafood fraud, “call[ing] for international
efforts targeting IUU fishing and seafood fraud, improved enforcement
mechanisms, coordination with non-governmental actors, and the prolif-
eration of traceability requirements.”96
Recalling criticism of Marine Spatial Planning, the coordination be-
tween state and international schemes may be difficult to follow.97 “There
are important differences between the EU and U.S. approaches to IUU fish-
ing and seafood fraud: first, their efforts to identify and punish perpetrators
of IUU fishing are separate.”98 The U.S. and EU inspection schemes also
differ, given that the PSMA does not require specific inspection targets.99
A burgeoning commercial aspect of the blue economy which poses
unique governance issues is bio-prospecting, where no singular, univer-
sally recognized governance regime exists. Marine bio-prospecting consists
of procuring and analyzing samples of marine genetic material, and iden-
tifying potentially commercial products to be developed from them.100
This includes discovering components that have potential uses in the food,
industrial, and pharmaceutical sectors.101 An estimated 24,000 catalogued
marine-derived molecules exist.102 Of the known marine natural com-
pounds, thirteen different chemical agents that have their origins in
marine environments are in clinical trials, eleven of which show cancer-
fighting properties.103 Potential is there: only 1 % of the bacteria present
in seawater has been examined for potentially beneficial chemistry.104
That said, the lack of a universal definition of bio-prospecting creates
95 Presidential Memorandum from the White House on Comprehensive Framework to
Combat Illegal, Unreported, & Unregulated Fishing & Seafood Fraud (June 17, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/17/presidential-memoran
dum-comprehensive-framework-combat-illegal-unreporte [https://perma.cc/8BRN-7YTT].
96 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1648.
97 See Joseph F.C. DiMento, Environmental Governance of the Arctic: Law, Effect, Now
Implementation, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 23, 32 (2016).
98 Lampert, supra note 67, at 1653.
99 Id.
100 See NORWEGIAN MINISTRIES, NATIONAL STRATEGY 2009, MARINE BIOPROSPECTING—A




102 David Wolman, Humanity’s Health May Rely on what Sits on the Arctic’s Seabed, BBC
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uncertainty105: theorists debate the international regimes that may apply,
including the UNCLOS, the Convention on Biological Diversity and
international instruments such as those made through the World Trade
Organization and World Intellectual Property Organization.106
The benefits and uncertainties associated with governance struc-
tures are more pronounced when focusing on the Arctic.107
III. THE ARCTIC: THE BLUE ECONOMY IN ACTION
The Arctic108 offers a complex blue economy case study. The Arctic
Ocean is indeed vast, affected by evolving environmental conditions and
increasing socioeconomic drivers.109 The ocean contains an approximately
6,100,000 square mile area and is nearly 1.5 times the size of the United
States.110 And the Arctic Ocean is changing—and changing by extremes.111
After only modest changes from 2013–2015, minimum sea ice extent at
the end of summer 2019 tied with 2007 and 2016 for the second lowest
since modern record keeping began in the late 1970s.112 Additional factors
to consider are that average surface air temperatures have been the
105 See SALVATORE ARICO & CHARLOTTE SALPIN, UNU-IAS, BIOPROSPECTING OF GENETIC
RESOURCES IN THE DEEP SEABED: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND POLICY ASPECTS at 15 (2006),
https://www.cbd.int/financial/bensharing/g-absseabed.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5JH-F6GF].
106 Id. at 2–3.
107 See generally Zhao Long, Arctic Governance: Challenges and Opportunities, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELS. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/arctic-governance [https://
perma.cc/8M65-NLWV].
108 Arctic Member states control territory at or above the Arctic Circle (66 degrees 33’N): the
United States, Russia, Canada, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Fre-
quently asked questions about the Arctic, NOAA PMEL ARCTIC ZONE, https://www.pmel
.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/faq.html [https://perma.cc/99M3-4CS3] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020);
Arctic States, ARCTIC COUNCIL, https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/ [https://perma.cc
/6RGC-MJP7] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 15 U.S.C. § 4111 defines the Arctic as “all United
States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north
and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all con-
tiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas;
and the Aleutian chain.” 15 U.S.C. § 4111.
109 See Jimena Alvarez et al., A Framework for Assessing the Economic Impacts of Arctic
Change, 49 AMBIO 407 (2020).
110 The average depth of the Arctic Ocean is 3,953 feet and it is 18,264 feet at its deepest
point. What is the world’s smallest ocean?, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., NOAA, https://ocean
service.noaa.gov/facts/smallestocean.html [https://perma.cc/368H-97LK] (last modified
Apr. 4, 2020).
111 See 2019 Arctic Sea Ice Minimum Tied for Second Lowest on Record, NASA (Sept. 23,
2019), https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2913/2019-arctic-sea-ice-minimum-tied-for-second
-lowest-on-record/ [https://perma.cc/JB2Z-YQ46].
112 An analysis of satellite data by NASA and the National Snow and Ice Data Center
illustrates that the 2019 minimum extent measured 1,600,000 square miles. Id.
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highest since 1900,113 and snow cover extent in the North American Arc-
tic during spring has been the lowest in satellite record.114 Ocean acidifi-
cation is increasing, due primarily to the absorption of carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere.115
The socioeconomic changes involving and affecting Arctic mari-
time issues are also increasing.116 In 2016, the thirteen-deck cruise ship
Crystal Serenity embarked on its sold-out voyage through the Northwest
Passage.117 The ship safely docked in New York City thirty-two days
later—but significant search and rescue concerns were raised given the
scope of this voyage.118 Projected vast amounts of Arctic energy resources
exist.119 The oft-cited 2008 United States Geological Survey Arctic-wide
hydrocarbon potential study estimates the Arctic contains 90,000,000,000
barrels of oil, 1,669,000,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas and
44,000,000,000 barrels of natural gas liquids.120
The existing structure of Arctic governance reveals how blue
economy matters would fit into this evolving construct.121 Key emerging
issues—from sustainable fisheries to bio-prospecting—are often covered
(or not) under existing legal mechanisms.122 To discuss Arctic governance
involves the nascent discipline of Arctic law, which examines the laws
and regulations affecting the Arctic, “including the rights, responsibili-
ties and obligations of governmental and private actors.”123
While treaties and conventions exist that deal with Arctic-related
issues, no treaties exclusively focus on the Arctic.124 The primary exam-
ple is UNCLOS (which has yet to be ratified by the United States)125 that




116 See Arctic Law & Policy Institute, University of Washington, Arctic Law & Policy Year
in Review: 2016, 7 WASH. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 115, 117 (2017).
117 Id. at 123.
118 Id. at 209–10.
119 U.S.DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,U.S.GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE AP-
PRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 1 (2008).
120 Id.
121 See Edward T. Canuel, The Four Arctic Law Pillars: A Legal Framework, 46 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 735, 739–40 (2015).
122 See generally ARICO & SALPIN, UNU-IAS, supra note 105, at 7.
123 Canuel, supra note 121, at 737–38. Arctic law is divided into four distinct components:
hard law, soft law, domestic law, and transboundary private law.
124 Id. at 739–740.
125 UNCLOS, supra note 81, at 397, 404, 411.
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guarantees signatory state vessels’ navigational rights and freedoms
throughout the world’s oceans. “UNCLOS codifies member rights over all
oceanic resources, including on and under the ocean floor in a member
state’s 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.”126 The Convention
provides Arctic maritime scientific research rules, territorial limitations,
and marine environment protection responsibilities (and rights).127 Ad-
ditionally, the Convention covers various Arctic issues that should sound
familiar to the blue economy, including “fisheries management, pollution
prevention, resource conservation, and international shipping regula-
tions.”128 Additionally, many of the Arctic soft law regional and interna-
tional instruments do not have unanimous support from the Arctic states.129
Within this legal framework, governance plays an integral role.
The Arctic Council is the principal intragovernmental forum contending
with Arctic issues, composed of the eight Arctic states, with membership
including the six groups representing the Arctic indigenous peoples.130 The
Council promotes cooperation, coordination and interaction among the
Arctic states with a mandate of Arctic sustainable development and envi-
ronmental protection.131 The current Chair country of the Council is Iceland
(through 2021), espousing the theme “Together towards a sustainable
Arctic.”132 Marine issues are crucial throughout the Council’s four working
126 Canuel, supra note 121, at 740 (citing to UNCLOS, supra note 81, at arts. 2,33,57).
Under certain conditions, UNCLOS allows states to extend their EEZ outside 200
nautical miles to 350 miles. Christopher Joyner, The Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean,
18 J. TRANSNT’L L. & POL’Y 195, 203 (2009).
127 Canuel, supra note 121, at 740 (citing to UNCLOS, supra note 81, at arts. 3, 238, 56).
128 Id. (citing to UNCLOS, supra note 81, at arts. 63, 211, 115–19, 58).
129 This includes the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL), Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 (as modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating
to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships, Feb. 17, 1978,
1340 U.N.T.S. 61), the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, and the International Convention
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 51.
130 See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387.
131 Id. See also Canuel, supra note 121, at 741.
132 “The theme of the Arctic Council Chairmanship program for 2019–2021 reflects Iceland’s
commitment to the principle of sustainable development and refers to the necessity of
close cooperation between the states and peoples of the region and beyond. With sustainable
development as an overarching theme, Iceland will highlight four priorities: The Arctic
Marine Environment, Climate and Green Energy Solutions, People and Communities of
the Arctic, and a Stronger Arctic Council.” Icelandic Chairmanship, ARCTIC COUNCIL,
https://arctic-council.org/en/about/chairmanship/ [https://perma.cc/MWS2-9RTJ] (last
visited Nov. 2, 2020).
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groups.133 One of the Arctic Council’s major marine-focused deliverables
with blue economy implications was the Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
ment of 2009, a groundbreaking report, which weighed 120 factors as it
discussed the future of Arctic marine use.134 The report presented various
recommendations, focusing on issues including the legal governance frame-
works in the Arctic Ocean, limited seasonal windows of operation for
Arctic shipping, and the role of transit fees in coastal Arctic routes.135
And there are calls for the Arctic Council to assume a role in en-
forcing binding agreements—currently outside its mandate.136 Take the
International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), a specialized agency of the
United Nations, which developed an International Code of Safety for Ships
Operating in Polar Waters (“Polar Code”).137 Entered into force on
January 1, 2017, the Polar Code is mandatory under both the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”) and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”). The
Code covers “design, construction, equipment, operational, training, search
and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships operat-
ing in” the Arctic and Antarctica.138 The Polar Code covers the full range
of design, construction, equipment, operational, training, search and rescue,
and environmental protection matters relevant to ships operating in the
inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles.139 It sets global standards
on the safety, security, and environmental performance of international
shipping.140 The Polar Code is the IMO’s first binding bipolar instru-
ment.141 However, although the Polar Code is binding, the IMO does not
133 Id.




136 Richard Wanerman, Note, Freezing Out Noncompliant Ships: Why the Arctic Council
Must Enforce the Polar Code, 47 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 429, 431 (2015); SEAS AT RISK,
BLUE MANIFESTO:THE ROADMAP TO A HEALTHY OCEAN IN 2030 (2020), https://seas-at-risk
.org/images/pdf/publications/SAR_BLUE_MANIFESTO_DEPLIANT_A4_plie_BaT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AB9N-A8MV].
137 Shipping in polar waters, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Hot
Topics/polar/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/66Q2-UHXQ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
138 Id.; see also Armand de Mestral, The EU as an Arctic Power: Analysis of the Competence
of the EU in the Arctic by Policy Areas, 35 DAL. L.J. 329, 339 (2012).
139 Shipping in polar waters, supra note 137.
140 Id.
141 Øystein Jensen, The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Finalization,
Adoption and Law of the Sea Implications, 7 ARCTIC REV. L. & POL. 60, 61 (2016).
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have a mandatory enforcement mechanism; it is up to individual states
to comply with the Polar Code.142
The Polar Code demonstrates a trend that has emerged which
impacts the blue economy, the growth of soft law, and the hardening of
soft law.143 On May 28, 2008, the five Arctic Ocean coastal states (United
States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark) issued the Ilulissat Dec-
laration.144 They agreed to forestall a “new comprehensive international
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”145 which influenced outside calls
for a hard law Arctic Treaty.146
The Oslo Declaration, signed by the five coastal Arctic states in
2015, brings us back to IUU fishing, a key consideration of the blue econ-
omy.147 The Declaration deters unregulated commercial fishing in the
142 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 134, at 4; ØYSTEIN JENSEN, THE IMO GUIDELINES FOR
SHIPS OPERATING IN ARCTIC ICE-COVERED WATERS: FROM VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY
TOOL FOR NAVIGATION SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION?, at v (2007), https://
www.fni.no/getfile.php/131675-1469868943/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R0207.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9J8A-WAQ9].
143 The trend of creating certain Arctic binding obligations is most pronounced within the
Arctic Council’s recent deliverables, and all of them affect the blue economy; e.g.,
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the
Arctic art. 2, May 12, 2011, T.I.A.S. No.13-119 (specifying rescue assistance and informa-
tion sharing obligations across the Arctic); Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic art. 1, May 15, 2013, T.I.A.S. No.16
-325; Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation art. 1, May 11,
2017, T.I.A.S. No. 18-523. For a discussion on how soft law instruments are hardening
within the Arctic context, see Canuel, supra note 3, at 55–56.
144 Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, https://cil.nus.edu.sg
/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2008-Ilulissat-Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JYU-X9DC].
145 Id.
146 The Declaration stated that
[n]otably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obliga-
tions concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental
shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered
areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses
of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims. . . . This frame-
work provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the
five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national
implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore
see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime
to govern the Arctic Ocean. We will keep abreast of the developments
in the Arctic Ocean and continue to implement appropriate measures.
Id.
147 Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central
Arctic Ocean, July 16, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud
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high seas waters of the 1,100,000 square mile Central Arctic Ocean.148
The Declaration, which is non-binding, recognizes that, although com-
mercial fishing in Arctic waters is not imminent, the reduction of Arctic
sea ice and environmental challenges in the region necessitates a precau-
tionary approach to prevent unregulated fishing in the area.149 “The so-
called Arctic Ocean high seas ‘donut hole’ covered by [the Declaration]
lies beyond the five states’ exclusive economic zones.”150
The diversity of governance mechanisms blur international, domes-
tic, and substate distinctions. Blue ocean topics previously raised more
broadly are amplified when examined within the Arctic context.151 Marine
management is one example: from a U.S., purely domestic perspective,
the “Arctic Fishery Management Plan152 is the guiding plan for fisheries in
the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. It closes all federal waters in [these seas]
to commercial fishing until there is enough information to manage them
sustainably.”153 Yet, there are gaps in this regime: the move does not regu-
late subsistence fishing.154 The Council recognized that the
emergence of unregulated, or inadequately regulated,
commercial fisheries in the Arctic EEZ [Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone] off Alaska155 could have adverse effects on the
/vedlegg/folkerett/declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-July-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P94B-9FWH] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
148 Arctic Law & Policy Institute, University of Washington, supra note 116, at 125, 131.
149 Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central
Arctic Ocean, supra note 147.
150 Arctic Law & Policy Institute, University of Washington, supra note 116, at 125.
151 Thomas Au et al., Note, Niagra International Moot Court Competition 2013: Commentary:
The Arctic Ice Melt: Emerging Resources, Emerging Issues, 38 CAN.-U.S.L.J. 195, 204 (2013).
152 David Roche et al., Ocean Policy and the Trump Administration, 47 ENV’T L. REP.
10287, 10291–92 (2017).
153 Id.
154 Under the FMP,
[a]ll Federal waters of the U.S. Arctic will be closed to commercial fishing
for any species of finfish, mollusks, crustaceans, and all other forms of
marine animal and plant life; however, harvest of marine mammals
and birds is not regulated by the Arctic FMP. The Arctic FMP will not
regulate subsistence or recreational fishing or State of Alaska-managed
fisheries in the Arctic.
Arctic Fishery Management, N.PAC.FISHERY MGMT.COUNCIL, https://www.npfmc.org/arc
tic-fishery-management/ [https://perma.cc/NBF2-5FZC] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
155 The Council’s Arctic FMP covers the U.S. Arctic EEZ waters offshore Alaska. This area
is the Arctic Management Area, and is defined as all marine waters in the U.S. EEZ of
the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas from three nautical miles offshore the coast of Alaska or
its baseline to 200 nautical miles offshore, north of Bering Strait (from Cape Prince of
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sensitive ecosystem and marine resources of this area,
including fish, fish habitat, and non-fish species that in-
habit or depend on marine resources of the U.S. Arctic
EEZ, and the subsistence way of life of residents of Arctic
communities.156
The Council’s Arctic Plan is created under authority of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act;157 the management plan for the U.S. Arctic EEZ is an
ecosystem-based management policy.158
Even with that approach, uncertainty exists. For example, the
Magnuson-Stevens Act currently states that overfishing is disallowed
and sets quantitative definitions as to what constitutes overfishing.159
However, the MSA does not address the harm to fisheries from activities
in other sectors, with the exception of calling for consultation on activi-
ties authorized by federal agencies that may impact essential fish habi-
tats.160 “An EBM approach could focus on these impacts by including
cross-sectoral and cross-agency consideration of impacts along with de-
velopment of management measures to address those impacts.”161
On the bilateral front, the United States and Russia entered into
a treaty combatting IUU fishing in 2015.162 “Alaskan crab fishers in the
Bering Sea, which lies just south of the Arctic, strongly supported the
agreement (which is not geographically limited).”163 Illegally harvested
Russian crab has cost Alaskan Bering Sea fishermen up to an estimated
$560 million.164 From 2003–2013, The World Wildlife Fund had previously
issued a research report highlighting the significance of the problem from
2003–2013: “overharvest due to illegal crab harvesting was two to four
Wales to Cape Dezhneva) and westward to the 1990 U.S./Russia maritime boundary line
and eastward to the U.S./Canada maritime boundary. Id.
156 Id.
157 About the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), supra note 90; Magnuson-Stevens Act, supra
note 90.
158 Arctic Fishery Management, supra note 154.
159 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a) (West 2007).
160 Magnuson-Stevens Act, supra note 90.
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162 United States and Russia Sign Agreement to Prevent Illegal Fishing, NOAA FISHERIES,
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vent-illegal-fishing [https://perma.cc/Y5ZU-6AMA] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
163 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortensen, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 127 (2016).
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times the legal limit, causing grave concern about the sustainability of
several Russian Far East crab species.”165
Turning to Ecosystem Based Management,166 the Arctic Council
has called for the use of EBM, articulating nine principles including in-
corporating expert knowledge, inclusivity, and recognizing that ecosystems
and human activities are dynamic.167 Critics assert that the “articulation
of ecological criteria, determinations of scales, operational definitions of
what is sustainable, modeling of cumulative impacts, and integration of
types of knowledge not have commonly accepted, consensus meanings.”168
These elements of EBM169 each require “assignment of resources includ-
ing human resources to individual elements with, ideally, specified im-
plementation markers, including deadlines.”170
On bio-prospecting, Arctic Sea ice provides for varied microbial
communities because of its unique characteristics and is home to a great
number of diverse viruses and bacteria.171 Climate change also allows
greater access to Arctic genetic resources and Arctic bio-prospecting is
emanating as a key blue economy product.172 For example, in Arctic
Norway, cold waters “collide with warmer waters carried by northward
by the Gulf Stream.”173 “Here, organisms tolerate not only freezing or
near-freezing temperatures, but also turbulence caused by this clash of
currents. . . . [T]hose currents also allow the waters to be high in nutrients,
165 ILLEGAL RUSSIAN CRAB: AN INVESTIGATION OF TRADE FLOW, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
(2014), https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_illegal_crab_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4RDS-5KKY].
166 EXPERT GRP. ON ECOSYSTEM-BASED MGMT.,ARCTIC COUNCIL,ECOSYSTEM-BASED MAN-
AGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC (2013), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/113
74/122/MM08_EBM_report%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma
.cc/4QY9-UEFE] (“[Ecosystem-based management] is the comprehensive, integrated manage-
ment of human activities based on best available scientific and traditional knowledge
about the ecosystem and its dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences
that are critical to the health of ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of eco-
system goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.”).
167 Id.
168 DiMento, supra note 50.
169 See Rachel D. Long, Key Principles of Marine Ecosystem-Based Management, 57
MARINE POL’Y 53 (2015).
170 DiMento, supra note 50.
171 Mar Campins Eritja, Bio-Prospecting in the Arctic: An Overview of the Interaction
Between the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Access and Benefit Sharing, 44 B.C. ENV’T
AFF. L. REV. 223 (2017).
172 Id.
173 Wolman, supra note 102.
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making biodiversity rich and full of undiscovered chemistry.”174 To date,
some 150 novel bioactive compounds and fifty drug development leads
have been found in the Arctic, the majority of which are active against
cancer or influence immune response.175 “While enzymes adapted to
warmer temperatures are better known to science, cold-adapted enzymes
are not—and they might hold their own unique properties.”176 The roles
of indigenous peoples in identifying potential bio-prospecting sources,
using traditional knowledge, or concerns that their food sources would
be disaffected by bioprospecting, has also spurred debate—particularly
calls for assurances of an equitable disposition of harvested resources.177
IV. THE BLUE ECONOMY AHEAD: RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
My big fish must be somewhere.
–Ernest Hemingway, The Old Man and the Sea178
The blue economy is a researcher’s dream. With uncertain en-
forcement and application of diverse governance structures, a multiplicity
of actors and stakeholders at the domestic and international levels, and
frequently competing legal regimes affecting vast economic potential, the
stakes are high.179 That said, the opportunities for research are many, ex-
tending across disciplines including legal and social science subjects, such
as international relations, political science, and economics.180 And here are
just a few thoughts as to possible areas of future blue economy research.
The role of indigenous ownership concerning offshore energy de-
velopment raises legal questions in the blue economy context.181 Within and
across different legal jurisdictions throughout the Arctic states, what prop-
erty rights, if any, may be raised by indigenous peoples under respective
174 Id.
175 See Eritja, supra note 171 (“[u]sing genetic resources from the Arctic’s marine environ-
ment and microorganisms, biotechnology research has targeted a few key areas, such as
industrial processes, food technology, pollution control technologies, pharmaceutical and
medical products, and health-related advancements”).
176 Wolman, supra note 102.
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179 Taskforce on Ocean Governance: Blue Economy, OCEAN GOVERNANCE, https://www
.earthsystemgovernance.net/oceans/?page_id=79 [https://perma.cc/958D-MS6Q] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2020).
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federal, state, local, territorial, or tribal law? In Alaska, for example, the
federal government has paramount power to regulate seabed and ocean
exploitation to safeguard the defense of the U.S. and regulation of in-
ternational commerce.182 That concept conflicts with certain case law,
including People of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1984)
which held that “aboriginal title or right is a right of exclusive use and
occupancy held by Natives in lands and waters used by them and their
ancestors prior to the assertion of sovereignty over such areas by the
United States.”183 In this context, and throughout the legal regimes of the
Arctic states, to what extent do aboriginal rights exist against claims that
the so-called paramountcy doctrine otherwise trumps/extinguishes them?
What are the implications for commercial actors seeking certainty when
undertaking potential projects affected by that U.S. legal doctrine, or its
foreign correlatives?
Blue economy sustainability within the context of corporate
governance is an area ripe for additional scholarship.184 For example,
“[s]ustainability reporting—publishing information on an organization’s
governance and impacts on the environment, economy, and society—is
a type of soft law and intended to catalyze dialogue and action about
stakeholder concerns.”185 Concepts such as regulation by voluntary dis-
closure, though global in scope, are not grounded singularly in common
law or civil law traditions.186 The applicability of the blue economy could
accordingly reveal unique governance mechanisms.
Further research could exist on the declaration, implementation,
and enforcement of Marine Protected Areas (“MPAs”), particularly in the
Arctic. One may assess the legal and policy implications associated with
such MPAs.187 Relatedly, is there the feasibility of a Pan-Arctic Network
of MPAs, including high seas MPAs? And to additionally mire the issue,
182 Edward Canuel, U.S. Arctic Hydrocarbon Extraction: Exploring the Confluence of Law
and Identity, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 299, 318 (2016).
183 Id. (citing Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
184 Taskforce on Ocean Governance: Blue Economy, supra note 179.
185 Gerlinde Berger-Walliser et al., Using Proactive Legal Strategies for Corporate
Environmental Sustainability, 6 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 1, 29 (2016).
186 Id. at 30 (citing to Adam J. Sulkowski & D. Steven White, Financial Performance,
Pollution Measures and the Propensity to Use Corporate Responsibility Reporting: Impli-
cations for Business and Legal Scholarship, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 491, 496,
503–04 (2009)).
187 See ENV’T L. INST., LEGAL TOOLS FOR STRENGTHENING MARINE PROTECTED AREA EN-
FORCEMENT:AHANDBOOK (2016), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/legal-tools
-strengthening-mpa-enforcement-eli-2016_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7VA-D4U3].
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there are no clear, internationally recognized “uniform” legal definitions
of MPAs.188
And what of the Arctic Council? Is there a way to even further
integrate or socialize the various multiple marine-focused projects that
exist among the various Council Working and Expert groups? Is there
room for the Council to tackle the harmonization of standards and
regulations—perhaps by Arctic States’ marine industries?189 Does the
hardening of soft law have unintended consequences for future Arctic
Council agreements? How can a broader discussion of innovative topics
like the blue bioeconomy be effectively advanced through, or by, the blue
economy?190
Building on the Council’s extensive work on black carbon issues
could support the increasing global discussion of blue carbon.191 Namely,
room exists to explore synergies and governance issues between black
carbon projects and blue carbon habitats. Coastal blue carbon is the
carbon stored and sequestered in coastal ecosystems (mangrove forests,
seagrass meadows, and salt marshes).192 Blue carbon habitats are being
lost rapidly worldwide,193 but the benefits of carbon sequestration and
storage provide a driver for accelerated conservation and restoration of
188 Id. at 2–3.
189 For more information on the Arctic Council, see Arctic Council—About, ARCTIC COUNCIL,
https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/KJ7N-YP4U] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2020).
190 The term ‘blue bioeconomy’ refers to sustainably maximising the value
and use of aquatic bioresources using innovative processing methods.
It is a source for great optimism for the circumpolar region. Today,
estimates reveal that up to 43% of captured fish and shellfish resources
end up either as wastage or discarded material. This means that com-
panies are throwing away 43% of the biomass that could potentially
generate substantial profits by developing methods for turning ‘waste’
into high value products for food, feed, bio-products and bioenergy sectors.
The blue bioeconomy is a kind of back to basics thinking in the sense
that it revolves around making the most of available resources, and max-
imizing the value of and revenue from marine catches while minimizing
waste and negative environmental impacts of marine operations.
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these habitats—with global (climate) and local (fisheries and ecosystem
services) benefits.194
Similarly, Arctic stakeholders could strengthen efforts to examine
the emerging threat of “gray waters” in the Arctic.195 As greater maritime
transportation is anticipated as sea ice declines, particularly related to
tourism, gray water dumping is projected to increase.196 Gray water in-
cludes detergent-containing shower or laundry water, that may also
contain nutrients, metals, food particles, and microplastics—all with the
possibility of contaminating shellfish and causing algae blooms creating
oceanic “dead zones.”197 Not all Arctic State jurisdictions have Arctic-spe-
cific regulations that require onboard marine sanitation devices before
releasing gray water.198
Concerning IUU fishing, one could compare the fishing regimes
of states with annual catch limits to hopefully further reduce, and even-
tually halt, overfishing.199 Evaluating governance schemes to maintain
monitoring catch levels and keeping them in check on an annual basis
could reduce the chance of overfishing and ensure long-term biological
and economic sustainability.200 Similarly, beneficial, impactful results could
result upon studying management tools to increase regulatory efficiency
of marine aquaculture, supporting science and technology development to
increase production, and collaborating with international partners on scien-
tific exchanges. All of these could ease impacts from the growing global
population, and produce creative ways to increase food production.201
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International research opportunities focusing on the blue economy
should gather universities and centers of excellence across the globe,
undertaking an inter, and intra, disciplinary approach. The group could
tackle activities organized around major themes, including 1) evaluating
and exploring the role of scientific advances and enabling technologies
in driving innovation in the ocean economy; 2) investigating emerging
patterns and platforms of collaboration in innovation among different
marine and maritime actors in ocean research and development around
the world; 3) extending the frontiers of the use of socioeconomic valua-
tion, analysis, and tools further into areas of ocean-related activities; and
4) analyzing the role of the public sector and the impacts of policy mixes
in boosting innovation in the ocean economy.
The great American baseball player and wit Yogi Berra once said
that “[i]f the world were perfect, it wouldn’t be.”202 Exploring the blue
economy is fraught with uncertainties, including imperfect governance
mechanisms, data gaps, and lack of resources to safeguard enforcement
measures.203 Acknowledging, addressing, and confronting related legal
challenges affecting our oceans will continue to yield important opportu-
nities to promote near and long-term sustainable development.204 Berra
also noted that “when you come to a fork in the road, take it.”205 We are at
such a crossroad. Through a thoughtful understanding of the blue economy,
the right path could be taken, so that we can, at the very least, attempt
to tackle the daunting hurdles facing the global sea.
202 Michael F. Kay, When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It!, FORBES (June 17,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkay/2014/06/17/when-you-come-to-a-fork-in
-the-road-take-it/#7c615156c80f [https://perma.cc/QN9S-L29J].
203 WORLD BANK GRP., BLUE ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (APR. 2016), http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/446441473349079068/AMCOECC-Blue-Economy-Develop
ment-Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GL3-LNWG].
204 Douglas M. Johnston & David L. VanderZwaag, The Ocean and International Environ-
mental Law: Swimming, Sinking, and Treading Water at the Millennium, 43 OCEAN &
COASTAL MGMT. 141 (2000).
205 Kay, supra note 202.
